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The 2010 Affordable Care Act introduced a mandate expanding
dependent health insurance coverage to young adults up to age 26.
I explore whether this expansion induced job lock for parents of
eligible young adults, since many parents’ health insurance is tied
to employment. Using a difference-in-difference strategy comparing
parents of children above and below the age cutoff, I find that the
mandate reduced parents’ retirement rate by 2.9 percentage points,
causing them to delay retirement up to 1.7 years. Early retirees are
very responsive, as well as individuals with Social Security eligible
spouses, suggesting the mandate interacted with Social Security.
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1 Introduction
For many Americans, health insurance coverage is inextricably tied to work.
According to the Current Population Survey, employer-based health insur-
ance covered 55.7 percent of the population for some or all of the 2016
calendar year (Barnett and Berchick 2017). Tying benefits to jobs may
introduce inefficiencies in the labor market. Workers value health insur-
ance differentially, but it is hard for employers to tailor compensation at
an individual level to account for this variation. As a result, workers’ la-
bor supply and job mobility may be distorted if a worker stays at a job
because she values the job’s employer-based health insurance highly. This
is a phenomenon known as “job lock.”
Job lock poses a problem in many dimensions of labor supply. For one,
it may limit job mobility. Instead of picking the job which maximizes her
marginal productivity, a worker may pick a job in which she is less pro-
ductive but which offers health insurance. Thus, job lock prevents optimal
matches between firms and workers. Not only can healthcare benefits lock
workers into one job versus another, but they can also lock workers into
the labor force itself. Health insurance is an important factor in the retire-
ment decision, since older workers are more likely to experience negative
health shocks. Even if a worker would rather retire earlier, she may be
too risk-averse to expose herself to a gap in insurance coverage before she
is eligible for Medicare, and thus will delay retirement until 65. To add
another dimension of complexity to the issue, many Americans are not in-
sured through their own job, but rather through a spouse or parent’s job.
So job lock may be exacerbated when many individuals’ insurance coverage
is tied to a single job.
Identifying the existence and extent of job lock is an empirical chal-
lenge, since individuals with and without employer-sponsored insurance
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likely differ in many dimensions. So, simply comparing job mobility and
labor supply of these two groups is insufficient. There is an extensive liter-
ature, discussed in Section 2, studying job lock and specifically its effect on
retirement decisions. This paper contributes to this literature by using a
policy change affecting older workers which exogenously increased the value
of employer-sponsored health insurance for some workers but not others.
One of the most popular and well-publicized components of the 2010
Affordable Care Act (ACA) was the mandate to expand health insur-
ance coverage for young adult dependents. The dependent coverage man-
date required insurers offering dependent coverage to cover adult children
up to age 26. As a result, many parents’ employer-sponsored insurance
plans suddenly expanded coverage to their young adult children. This pol-
icy change presents a quasi-experimental setting to study how employer-
provided health benefits interact with these parents’ labor supply. Specifi-
cally, by comparing parents of children older and younger than 26 in 2010,
I leverage the eligibility requirements of the mandate to identify the causal
effect of dependent health insurance on parental labor supply. Given that
most of these parents were in their 50s or 60s, this provides an opportunity
to study the effect of employer-provided health insurance on retirement
behavior.
In this paper, I use a difference-in-difference strategy to find that ex-
panding dependent insurance decreased the retirement rate for affected
parents by 2.9 percentage points, or relative to the average post-policy rate
had the mandate not been enacted. Comparing retirement profiles for the
two groups, this translates into a delay in retirement of up to 1.7 years.
Early retirees are particularly responsive – I find larger effects for parents
too young to qualify for Social Security retirement benefits and parents
who qualified for early Social Security (i.e., turn 62) in the post-policy pe-
riod. Since only one parent has to delay retirement to take advantage of
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the mandate, I also look at how couples decide which parent delays. I find
that age and Social Security are deciding factors; the younger parent is
more likely to delay retirement, especially if the older parent qualifies for
Social Security. I do not find any effect of the mandate on other labor force
outcomes such as mobility, switching to part-time work, or involuntary job
losses.
Before the ACA mandate, insurance plans often only covered depen-
dents up to age 19 or until they were out of school. Some individual
states had their own dependent coverage mandates, but eligibility require-
ments varied widely (e.g., by dependent’s marital status, student status,
or employer-sponsored insurance) and almost all did not require coverage
up to age 26 (see Depew 2015, Table 1 for an overview of state policies).
In contrast, the ACA dependent coverage mandate was a national policy
with no eligibility requirements besides age. As a result, any young adult
under 26 whose parent’s health insurance covered dependents could obtain
coverage under her parent’s plan. So for dependents who were added to
their parent’s insurance after the ACA, the mandate implicitly tied their
health insurance to their parents’ job.
The policy was announced in March 2010 and insurers were required
to comply by September 2010. The implementation was staggered as some
insurers chose to enroll before the September deadline. But by September
2010, almost all insurers had complied. In March 2010, the Internal Rev-
enue Service also amended its rules to allow health benefits for dependents
to be tax-exempt up until age 27 (Internal Revenue Service 2010). The de-
pendent mandate had a significant impact on insurance rates among young
adults. Antwi, et al. (2013) estimate that about 2 million young adults
added parental employer-sponsored insurance as a result of the mandate.
In 2016, 26 year olds were 1.19 times more likely to be uninsured than 25
year olds (Barnett and Berchick 2017). In this paper, I study the impact
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of the mandate on another population: the parents of these young adults.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 I review the related
literature. In Section 3, I lay out a conceptual framework. In Section 4,
I describe data and methodology. I present my results in Section 5, and
conclude in Section 6.
2 Literature Review
Much of the empirical literature on employer-sponsored insurance and re-
tirement looks at the availability of retirement insurance and thus suffers
from endogeneity issues, as noted by Gruber and Madrian (2004). The
most convincing studies use the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1985 (COBRA). COBRA was a national law which gave em-
ployees access to continuation coverage under employer-sponsored health
insurance for up to 18 months after leaving a job. Under COBRA, for-
mer employees pay out of pocket for their own coverage after leaving, but
they have access to the employer’s lower group rate. Gruber and Madrian
(1995) use variation in pre-COBRA continuation mandates across states
to identify the effect of the national policy, which in most states expanded
continuation coverage. They find that the retirement rate increased by 28
percent in states without mandates, whereas it stayed about constant in
ones with mandates. In a following paper, Gruber and Madrian (1997)
find that access to continuation coverage raises the odds of a job transi-
tion for working-age men. The identification strategy of COBRA papers
relies on exogenous changes in the price of self-insuring, whereas my strat-
egy relies on changes in the value of employer-sponsored insurance itself
to individuals. Additionally, the identification strategy of COBRA studies
relies on variation across states, whereas in my policy setting I can com-
pare across individual workers and thus control for individual fixed effects.
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There has also been substantial work on job lock for low-income mothers
and secondary earners, who are not the focus on this paper; see Gruber
and Madrian (2004) for a detailed review of the literature.
Another strand of the job lock and retirement literature uses structural
models to estimate the relationship between retirement and health insur-
ance. Using a dynamic programming model of retirement, Rust and Phe-
lan (1997) showed that retiree health insurance decreases the probability of
working full-time by up to 20 percent for older workers. French and Jones
(2011) estimate a life cycle model using the rich Health and Retirement
Study data and incorporate consumption smoothing through saving. They
find that raising the Medicare age from 65 to 67 slightly increases employ-
ment probability for individuals aged 60-69. While not directly comparable
to these results, my findings line up with these structural studies in that I
also find that employer-sponsored insurance significantly affects retirement
behavior.
To my knowledge, this is the first study looking at the effect of the ACA
dependent coverage mandate on dependents’ parents. There is already a
substantial literature documenting how it affected young adults. Antwi
et al. (2013) found that the mandate increased dependent coverage and
decreased individual purchased/own-employer coverage. The evidence on
job lock for young adults is mixed. Bailey and Chorniy (2015) find that
the mandate did not increase job mobility among dependents. Antwi et al.
(2013) find that the mandate decreased the probability of working full time
and the number of hours worked, while Heim et al, (2017) report that em-
ployment and self-employment were largely unaffected. The ACA mandate
improved health in certain dimensions like body mass index, self-assessed
health, and cancer detection (Barbaresco, Courtemanche, and Qi 2015;
Robbins et al. 2015). It also reduced debt from healthcare expenditures,
delinquencies, and bankruptcy (Blascak and Mikhed 2018).
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3 Conceptual Framework
Next, I lay out a simple conceptual framework based on Gruber and Madrian
(2004) to illustrate how the dependent mandate could induce job lock for
potential retirees. I model the decision to work or retire at a given age
rather than the decision to switch jobs because, as shown later in my re-
sults, I find that the mandate had no effect on job switches. Additionally,
the average age of parents in my sample was 58 at the end of the panel, so
many were on the cusp of retirement.
Assume that workers with inelastic labor supply decide between two
states: working with insurance, or not working without insurance. For
simplicity, assume that health insurance is tied to working (i.e., there is no
retirement insurance, Medicaid, or private insurance). Let utility at age
t be Ut(w,H,L), where w is the wage at the current job, H is a dummy
variable for health insurance coverage, and L is inelastic leisure. Utility is
increasing in all three arguments. Since health insurance is tied to working,
define H = 1{L = 0}. w and L are related as follows:

w > 0 L = 0
w = 0 L = 1
Since I eliminate the possibility of working at a job without health
insurance, I sidestep modeling the employer’s decision of whether to offer
insurance. Each year, individuals simply compare working with health
insurance, Ut(w, 1, 0), to not working without health insurance, Ut(0, 0, 1).
If Ut(w, 1, 0) ≥ Ut(0, 0, 1), then they work this year.
Now, introduce a reform which changes the utility function as follows:
U ′t(w,H,L) =

Ut(w +B − CD,H,L) child ≤ 26
Ut(w,H,L) child > 26 or no child
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where B ≥ 0 represents the value of dependent health insurance to a
parent and CD ≥ 0 is the compensating differential by which an employer
reduces the parent’s compensation since she now values employer-sponsored
insurance more. If the wage does not change (CD = 0), the reform increases
the value of continuing to work.
In the case of no job lock, firms set CD such that CD = B for each
individual. Since workers now value employer-sponsored health insurance
more, firms can lower their wage until their utility is back to the pre-reform
level and capture this rent. As a result, affected workers’ labor supply will
not change and the reform will not induce job lock.
In reality, firms generally cannot tailor compensation packages on an
individual basis, and thus cannot set CD = B. In the extreme case, as-
sume CD = 0, meaning an individual’s wage doesn’t change at all after the
reform. This is a plausible assumption since there are legal and logistical
constraints on reducing compensation only for those parents affected by the
mandate. When CD = 0, parents compare Ut(w + B, 1, 0) to Ut(0, 0, 1).
If there is heterogeneity in the value of dependent insurance across par-
ents, there will be individuals for whom previously Ut(w, 1, 0) < Ut(0, 0, 1),
but now Ut(w + B, 1, 0) > Ut(0, 0, 1). Put another away, this means that
absent the policy these individuals would have retired at age t, but now
they continue to work. Thus, the mandate will induce job lock for these
individuals.
This framework can incorporate Social Security retirement benefits by
introducing another option: Ut(S, 0, 1) if t ≥ A, where S is the Social
Security benefit and A is the eligibility age.1 Since utility is increasing in
wage, Ut(S, 0, 1) > Ut(0, 0, 1). Assuming CD = 0, an SS-eligible individual
1If A = 62, then this simple framework captures how individuals first become eligible
for early Social Security at age 62. But of course this is an extremely simplified version
of Social Security, since S is actually a function of age t and also varies by an individual’s
work history and marital status.
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now compares Ut(S, 0, 1) to Ut(w+B, 1, 0). If Ut(S, 0, 1) >> Ut(0, 0, 1), we
could observe individuals working while t < A because Ut(w + B, 1, 0) >
Ut(w, 1, 0), but then retiring at age A since Ut(w+B, 1, 0) < Ut(S, 0, 1) for
t ≥ A. In other words, individuals delay only up until they reach Social
Security eligibility, at which point they retire and take their Social Security
benefits2. However if Ut(w+B, 1, 0) > Ut(S, 0, 1), then the mandate could
cause some individuals to forgo Social Security.
4 Data and Identification Strategy
The data source I use is the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation (SIPP). SIPP surveys a nationally representative sam-
ple of 42,000 American households for about 4 years, asking them to recall
the past four months. The 2008 panel covers August 2008 to December
2013, which spans the pre- and post-policy period of the ACA. It collects
data on demographics, employment status, assets and earnings, health and
disability, government program participation, and job benefits. SIPP pro-
vides a rich monthly snapshot of work history during this period for every
individual in a household.
To define my treatment and control group, I will use the age of a re-
spondent’s youngest child. I define “treated” to mean that the respondent’s
youngest child is less than 26 in 2010, and “control” if the youngest child
is older than 26. In order to have relatively comparable groups, I restrict
my treatment group to parents of 23-25 year olds and the control group
to parents of 27-29 year olds. It is unclear whether children who were 26
in 2010 would be eligible or not, since insurance companies varied in when
they began to comply with the mandate. So, I do not assign parents of 26
2While individuals can technically claim SS while still working, they are subject to
an earnings test. In 2018, Social Security benefits are reduced $1 for every $2 earned
above $17,040 ($1420 a month).
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year olds to either treatment or control. This leaves 1372 individuals in the
treatment group and 1297 in control, with an average of 59.5 months of
observations per individual (out of 64 total possible months). In Table 1, I
report summary statistics of individual characteristics by treatment status.
Table 1: Summary statistics by treatment and control
Characteristic Type Treat (23-25) Control (27-29)
White percent 0.84 0.83
Female percent 0.64 0.63
Hispanic percent 0.09 0.07
Married percent 0.78 0.78
High School percent 0.89 0.90
College percent 0.3 0.3
Private HI in 2009 percent 0.76 0.76
Employed in 2009 percent 0.74 0.70
Age in 2009 mean 53.75 56.31
Number of children mean 2.30 2.36
Monthly income in 2009 (>0) mean $2970 $2556
Observations # 72747 71580
Individuals # 1372 1293
Months Observed mean 59.28 59.79
While the treatment and control groups are relatively similar in most
dimensions, it is important to note that the control group is older than
the treatment group. This makes sense, since the control group consists
of parents of older children. Age is an important factor in the retirement
decision. Thus, the baseline retirement rate for the control group should
be higher than the treatment group. However, in order for identification
with a difference-in-difference strategy, we do not need that the two groups
have the same baseline retirement rate – we just need that their retirement
rates follow parallel trends (at this point in their retirement profiles), which
I check for in the next section. Age may also play a role in other labor force
decisions, but the same logic of parallel trends applies.
Something else to note is that the sample contains more women than
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men. Women comprise 64 percent and 63 percent of the treatment and
control groups, respectively. This is because I do not directly observe ev-
ery adult dependent’s age, and must instead use mothers’ fertility history.
SIPP has limited information on family members not currently living in
the household, which is likely the case for most adult dependents. But
using a woman’s fertility history, I can consider the ages of the children a
woman gave birth to.3 I then link fathers (or step-fathers) in through the
mother’s current husband. Thus, I only add married men whose wives were
also in the sample, which explains the gender imbalance. Although men
and women in this sample are not directly comparable to each other, the
treatment and control groups are equally unbalanced in terms of gender
ratio and thus are comparable to each other.
I use responses only from individuals with valid interview status and
nonmissing identifiers. I consider whether a respondent has a job in the past
month, whether she is looking for a job, and her reason for not having a job.
I consider a respondent to be retired if her employment status for a given
month is “no job all month, no time on layoff and no time looking for work”
and the main reason for not having a job in the reference period (last four
months) is retirement. Besides retirement, I also look at unemployment,
non-retirement labor force exits, and changes in employer without leaving
the labor force.
I use a difference-in-difference identification strategy to estimate the
causal effect of the mandate, which relies on the parallel trends assump-
tion: absent the policy, treatment and control group outcomes would be
parallel to each other over this time period.4 In Figure 1, I plot the retire-
3SIPP only asks for the oldest and youngest children that a woman gave birth to.
Thus I also have no sense of how many eligible or ineligible children the respondent has,
although I do know the total number of children. However, these characteristics are fixed
over time and will be absorbed by individual fixed effects. I also do not observe ages
of adopted children or stepchildren, who would both count as dependents for insurance
purposes.
4Since retirement is an absorbing state, it would impossible for the retirement rate
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ment rate per month for the treated and control groups. Similar figures for
other outcomes like probability of not working and probability of changing
employers are included in the appendix (Figures A.1, A.2, and A.3). Visu-
ally, the two trends seem parallel until after policy enactment (September
2010), when the retirement rate for the treated group flattens out, but the
rate for the control group continues to climb. The gap in retirement rate
between the two groups widens over time, even as some children in the
treated group “age out” of eligibility (i.e., turn 26).
Figure 1: Monthly retirement rates for treated (parent of 23-25 in 2010)
and control (parent of 27-29) groups. Dashed vertical line represents policy
announcement in March 2010; solid vertical line represents policy enact-
ment September 2010.
If the parallel trends assumption is met, I can implement my main
difference-in-difference specification:
yit = β0 + β1Treati × Enactt + β2Seamit + αi + λt + εit (1)
yit is the outcome variable for individual i in month t. In the main
of the two groups to be parallel indefinitely. However, given the age range of the two
groups and the evidence in the graph, it may be safe to assume parallel trends in this
time period.
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specification, Enactt is a dummy variable which equals 1 after September
2010, when the mandate was enacted for all insurance plans, and 0 before.
Treati is a dummy variable which is 1 if the respondent’s youngest child
is 23-25 in 2010 and 0 if the respondent’s youngest child is 27-29. αi is
an individual fixed effect and λt is a month-year fixed effect. Seamit is an
individual-specific, time-varying dummy which equals 1 during a “seam”
month between reference periods during which the respondent is actually
surveyed. In a seam month, the individual is asked to recall information
about the reference period (past 4 months), and it is a well-known phe-
nomenon in longitudinal surveys that there is a higher likelihood of infor-
mation changes during a seam month (U.S. Census Bureau 2001). Robust
standard errors are clustered at the individual level. I use a linear prob-
ability model for ease of interpretation and because retirement rates are
never “too close” to 0 or 1. None of the predicted retirement values from
the main specification fall outside of (0,1)5. Later, I run this specification
on a variety of subsamples to see which subsample is driving the response.
β1 is the parameter of interest: it represents the average causal effect of
dependent coverage expansion on the probability of exiting the labor force,
retiring, or changing jobs. A negative β1 means that the treated group
is less likely to exit after the policy. With regard to retirement, it would
mean that the treated group delays retirement after the policy is enacted.
One concern with this specification is that treatment is assigned based
on potential eligibility through the child’s age, rather than actual eligibility
(i.e., whether the respondent had insurance which covered dependents). So
the group of respondents actually receiving treatment is a strict subset of
what I define as the treatment group. We do not have to worry about this
in the control group. Since the mandate has an explicit eligibility cutoff
at 26, no respondent in the control group is ever eligible for the dependent
5The predicted values from the main specification range from 0.054 to 0.205.
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coverage expansion. As I am estimating an intent-to-treat effect, we should
expect that, if anything, the estimate for β1 is biased toward zero.
I also run more flexible specifications to see how β1 varies over time
and with the child’s age. I replace Enactt with dummies for each month.
Montht is a month-year dummy (equivalent to λt above):
yit = β0 +
T∑
t=0
β1tTreati ×Montht + β2Seamit + αi +Montht + εit (2)
With this specification, β1t represents the difference in labor force out-
comes between treated and control groups in each month. If the parallel
trends assumption holds, we should see that β1t = 0 before policy enact-
ment/announcement. While we expect to see a gap between treated and
control emerge after September 2010, it is unclear whether it should in-
crease or decrease in magnitude over time. On one hand, we expect it to
increase as respondents’ labor supply decisions made in 2010 are realized
over time. On the other hand, it may decrease as children of the treated
group “age out” of eligibility over the years.
We might also expect that β1 varies with the age of the child. For a
parent whose child is 20 in 2010, the opportunity cost of exiting the labor
force in 2010 includes six potential years of dependent insurance; for a
parent of a 25 year old, the opportunity cost includes only one potential year
of dependent insurance. Thus, we should see that on average, parents of
younger children are more attached to the labor force than parents of older
(but still eligible) children. I explore this relationship with the following
specification:
yit = β0 +
26∑
a=19
β1a(ChildAgea × Enactt) + β2Seamit + αi + λt + εit (3)
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ChildAgea is a dummy variable which is 1 if the respondent’s child
is age a in 2010. β1a is the causal effect of the mandate for parents of
children of age a. I consider ages 19-26 because many insurance plans
covered dependents only until age 19. The comparison group is parents
with children aged 27-29 in 2010.
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
Table 2 presents the main difference-in-difference results from Equation 1
on various employment outcomes. Column 1 reports the result on a dummy
variable for not having a job in a given month. The policy reduced the like-
lihood of not having a job by about 1.9 percentage points. There seems to
be no effect on not having a job but looking for one (column 2). Instead,
the response is driven by job exits after which the individual is no longer
looking for a job (column 3). Put another way, we see an effect on la-
bor force exits rather than unemployment. This is expected since job lock
should not affect involuntary job losses which would contribute to unem-
ployment. Breaking this down even further, the effect seems to be coming
from reductions in retirement (column 5) rather than other labor force exits
(column 4). From columns 6 and 7, we see that there is also no discernible
effect on partial exits (i.e. having a job for some but not all weeks in a
month) or employer changes. Therefore, the result in column 1 is driven
entirely by a reduction in retirement. The policy reduced the likelihood of
retirement by 2.9 percentage points. The observed average retirement rate
after policy enactment for the treated group was 16.7 percent (although it
increases steadily over time). So, the dependent coverage mandate reduced
the retirement rate by about 14.8 percent (2.9/(2.9+16.7)) relative to the
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post-policy rate had the policy not been enacted. In comparison, Gruber
and Madrian (1995) find that one year of continuation coverage increased
the retirement rate by 1.1 percentage points (5.4 percent). As I will discuss
in Section 6, the 2.9 percentage point reduction in retirement rates trans-
lates into an average retirement delay of 0.74 years (and up to 1.7 for some
individuals).
Table 2: Difference-in-difference results from Equation 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No No job, No job, Not looking, Not looking, Partial Change
job looking not looking not retired retired LF exit employers
Treati × Enactt -0.019∗ 0.003 -0.022∗∗ 0.007 -0.029∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002)
Seam X X X X X X X
Indiv. FE X X X X X X X
Month-year effect X X X X X X X
Individuals 2678 2678 2678 2678 2678 2678 1900
Observations 144327 144327 144327 144327 144327 144327 92522
Standard errors in parentheses
(1) Outcome: No job (for at least some week of month)
(2) No job, looking for work
(3) No job, not looking for work
(4) No job, not looking, but not retired
(5) No job, not looking, and retired
(6) Partial exit (no job for part of but not entire month)
(7) Changed employers
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
In Table 3, I explore the retirement result further. In columns 2 and 3
I check that the results are robust to using Enactt (September 2010) and
Announcet (March 2010) as the post-policy period. In column 3, the coeffi-
cient on Treati×Enactt is significant and negative, while the coefficient on
Treati×Announcet is insignificant. Parents’ retirement behavior diverged
only when the policy was implemented by insurance companies, not when
it was announced by the government. Thus, I use Enactt to separate the
pre- and post-policy periods in the following analysis, although it is also
robust to using Announcet.
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In column 4, I re-run the main specification on an alternative definition
of retirement: not working because of retirement or because of a chronic
health condition. We may worry that some older workers may not officially
“retire” (i.e., state the reason they are not working as retirement), but stop
working with no intention of returning to the workforce because of a chronic
health condition. Chronic conditions are likely to lower productivity with-
out completely preventing workers from working, unlike a short-term injury
or illness. In this sense, they are similar to aging in that workers have some
flexibility in deciding when to stop working. In both cases, workers weigh
the benefits of working with reduced productivity against the cost of health
deterioration over time. Using retired or chronic health condition as the
outcome variable, I find a similar significant negative coefficient for β1. For
the rest of the analysis, I continue to use the main definition of retirement
since adding chronic illness into the definition likely adds noise to the out-
come variable, as seen by the slightly less significant coefficient in column
4 compared to the main result in column 1.
It is of note that the only labor force margin on which parents seem
to respond is retirement. One potential reason could be that the average
age of individuals considered is relatively high (about 54), and by this
point in their careers, they are less likely to have a non-retirement labor
force exit or a change in employers. This study differs from previous studies
which found an effect of health coverage on such outcomes because previous
studies focused on younger samples (Bansak and Raphael 2008; Gruber and
B. Madrian 1997).
Figure 2 plots the β1t coefficient from the flexible monthly specification
in Equation 2. Prior to policy announcement and enactment, there is no
significant difference between treatment and control groups, which supports
the parallel trends assumption. After the mandate is introduced, a gap
emerges between the two groups, which widens over time.
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Table 3: Retirement difference-in-difference results from Equation 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Retired Retired Retired Retired or
chronic health
Treati × Enactt -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Treati × Announcet -0.025∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.008) (0.006)
Seam X X X X
Indiv. FE X X X X
Month-year effect X X X X
Individuals 2678 2678 2678 2678
Observations 144327 144327 144327 144327
Standard errors in parentheses
(1) Enactment, Sep. 2010
(2) Announcement, Mar. 2010
(3) Announcement and enactment
(4) Outcome variable: retired or disabled
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Figure 2: Results from specification in Equation 2 using parents of 23-25
year olds as treated group. Coefficient on interaction of Treati andMontht.
Dashed vertical line represents policy announcement in March 2010; solid
vertical line represents policy enactment September 2010. Confidence in-
tervals are 95%.
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Figure 3 shows the results from a specification with interactions with
child’s age dummies, where the omitted group consists of parents of 27-
29 year olds. As discussed in Section 4, we might expect heterogeneous
treatment effects for parents of younger versus older (but still eligible)
children. In general, as the age of the parent’s youngest child gets closer
to the cutoff of 26, β1a decreases in magnitude. This is consistent with
the idea that retiring while a child is younger has a higher opportunity
cost for parents. Below age 25, the coefficients are significant and negative.
The coefficients for 25-26 year olds are insignificant. However, the point
estimates for parents of 19-24 year olds are not significantly different from
each other.
Figure 3: Coefficient on interaction of Treati and ChildAgea. Results
from specification in Equation 3. Confidence intervals are 95%.
5.2 Placebo and Robustness Checks
In Table 4, I report results from running the main specification on four
groups which, due to the specifics of the mandate, should be unaffected by
the policy. One natural placebo group consists of parents of older children,
like parents of 30-32 year olds (column 1). Comparing this placebo group
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to the original control group (parents of 27-29 year olds), we see that the
coefficient on Placeboi×Enactt is insignificant. I run the same specification
on subsamples which should be unaffected by the policy, parents covered
by Medicaid (column 2) and parents who did not have insurance before the
policy (column 3), and find no effect. Finally, I consider a counterfactual
policy in September 2008, assigning “treatment” to parents of 23-25 year
olds and “control” to parents of 27-29 year olds in 2008. Unfortunately,
this is not a perfectly clean counterfactual since the 2008 “treatment” group
slightly overlaps with the actual 2010 treated group (parents of 23 year olds
in 2008 would be parents of 25 year olds in 2010), and the 2008 “control”
treated group also overlaps with the actual control group (parents of 27 year
olds in 2008 would be parents of 29 year olds in 2010). Using 2009 as a
counterfactual policy would exacerbate this problem further. The cleanest
counterfactual would be to use 2007 or earlier, but unfortunately the SIPP
panel begins in 2008. Thus, we should expect that the coefficient in column
4 is biased away from zero relative to a “cleaner” 2007 counterfactual.
In the Figures A.6 and A.7, I include results from the flexible monthly
specification for each outcome in Table 4. Figures A.4 and A.5 check for
parallel trends.
One concern may be that the treatment and control groups are not
comparable to each other because control parents are older, and thus they
may approach early or full Social Security age at different rates. In Figure 4,
I vary the bandwidth used to define treatment and control groups to check
that my result is robust to this. The main specification uses a bandwidth
of 3, defining treatment as parents of 23, 24, or 25 year olds. To make the
treatment and control groups more comparable, I could have chosen to use
a bandwidth of 2 (24-25 vs. 27-28) or even 1 (25 vs. 27), at the expense of
power. As I increase the bandwidth, the treated and control groups become
less comparable. In Figure 4, we see that standard errors decrease as the
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Table 4: Placebo tests and counterfactual
Outcome variable: monthly retirement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Placebo Medicaid Uninsured 2008
subsample subsample counterfactual
Placeboi × Enactt -0.003
(0.011)
Treati × Enactt -0.021 -0.031
(0.037) (0.021)
Treat2008,i × Enact2008,t -0.015
(0.009)
Seam X X X X
Indiv. FE X X X X
Month-year effect X X X X
Individuals 2459 348 412 2621
Observations 134960 9531 22616 142118
Standard errors in parentheses
(1) Placebo group: parents of 30-32 year olds
(2) Subsample: parents covered by Medicaid
(3) Subsample: parents without insurance in 2009
(4) Counterfactual policy in Sep. 2008. Treated are 23-25 in 2008, control are 27-29 in 2008.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
bandwidth increases, but the point estimate is consistently negative and
relatively stable. If the negative main result was entirely driven by the age
difference between treatment and control, then as the bandwidth increases
and the age difference increases, the coefficient should become increasingly
negative. Instead, we see that it is relatively stable between bandwidths 2
and 5.
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Figure 4: Coefficient on interaction of Treati and Enactt, by bandwidth
for defining treatment and control groups. Confidence intervals are 95%.
5.3 Heterogeneity by Age and Social Security Eligi-
bility
The marginal benefits and costs of retirement are shaped by a variety of
incentives and preferences which vary over an individual’s lifetime. In ad-
dition to the marginal earnings from continuing to work and the marginal
costs of working as one ages, individuals must also consider incentives set
by programs like Social Security. Social Security eligibility and benefit
amounts are non-linear in age. Specifically, individuals gain early Social
Security retirement benefits at age 62 and full benefits at age 66. It is a
well-established empirical fact that individuals are more likely to retire at
the early and full Social Security retirement eligibility ages (Rust and Phe-
lan 1997). How does this change once the mandate is introduced, and is
there heterogeneity depending on what Social Security benefits individuals
qualify for?
I separate parents into groups depending on whether they cross either of
these age thresholds (62 or 66) in the post-policy period, 2011-2013. Table
5 summarizes how I define Social Security cohorts: “Young” consists of
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parents who are younger than 62 in the panel, “Early” consists of parents
who turn 62 in 2011-2013 and qualify for early SS, “Full” consists of parents
who turn 66 in 2011-2013 and qualify for full SS, and “Old” consists of
parents who turned 66 before 2011. Note that one group, parents who are
62 in 2010, does not fit neatly into any cohort as they turn 62 in 2010 and
66 in 2014. I also run a regression combining “Early” and “Full” together,
and include this group as well.
Table 5: Social Security Cohort Definition
Age in 2010 Year turn 62 Year turn 66 Cohort
<59 >2013 >2017 Young
59 2013 2017 Early
60 2012 2016 Early
61 2011 2015 Early
62 2010 2014
63 2009 2013 Full
64 2008 2012 Full
65 2007 2011 Full
>66 <2007 <2011 Old
I run the main specification on each Social Security cohort, and report
results in Table 6. Column 4 combines the “Early” and “Full” cohorts, as
well as parents who are 62 in 2010. The point estimates are negative for
all columns, but only significant the “Young” and “Early” cohorts. The
point estimate for “Early” individuals is substantially larger than that of
“Young” individuals – almost 4 times larger.6
One question these results raise is, are the responsive “Early” individ-
uals delaying until they reach early Social Security age at 62, or do they
6Alternatively, I define age cohorts by whether individuals turn 62 or 66 at some point
in the panel (2008-2013), not just in the post-policy period (2011-2013). These results
are reported in Table B.1 and are qualitatively similar. In A.8, I interact Treati×Policyt
with a dummy for parent’s age in 2010. We see that in general, parents who were close
to early retirement age were the most responsive, which lines up with the Social Security
cohort results.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity by SS age cohort
Outcome variable: monthly retirement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Young Early Full Early or Full Old
Treati × Enactt -0.014∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.001 -0.020 -0.014
(0.007) (0.024) (0.045) (0.021) (0.068)
Seam X X X X X
Indiv. FE X X X X X
Month-year effect X X X X X
Individuals 1808 427 237 785 98
Observations 95216 23873 13001 43570 5541
Standard errors in parentheses
(1) Subsample: individuals who are < 62 in 2013
(2) Subsample: individuals who turn 62 in 2011-2013
(3) Subsample: individuals who turn 66 in 2011-2013
(4) Subsample: individuals who turn 62 or 66 in 2011-2013
(5) Subsample: individuals who turned 66 before 2011
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
delay even further? If parents place high value on dependent health insur-
ance, then they may be willing to forgo Social Security benefits to keep
their insurance. In the context of the framework laid out in in Section 3, is
Ut(w + B, 1, 0) > Ut(S, 0, 1) when t >= A? In Figure 5, I plot the percent
of treated and control parents who are retired at a given age in the post-
policy period. If treated parents forgo Social Security for dependent health
insurance, then we should see a gap in the retirement profiles of the two
groups past age 62. However, if they delayed only up until they gain early
Social Security, then we should see the gap close around 62. In Figure 5
we see that a gap emerges between the two groups between ages 58 and 62;
treated parents in this age range are less likely to be retired than control
parents. However, past 62 (the dashed line) the gap closes and retirement
rates are similar across the two groups. This suggests that “Early” parents
delayed up until they qualified for early Social Security, but not past that
point.
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Figure 5: Percent retired by age in the post-policy period (2011-2013);
dashed line at 62.
5.4 Heterogeneity Within Couples
From the perspective of individuals, the ACA dependent mandate effec-
tively increased the benefit of continuing to work. From the perspective of
couples, however, the mandate exogenously increased the benefit of only
one of the two parents delaying retirement. Once a dependent is covered
under one parent’s insurance, there is no additional benefit to the other par-
ent also delaying retirement (in terms of dependent coverage). Retirement
is often a joint decision for married couples, as people take into account not
only their individual circumstances, but also that of their spouse (e.g., Lee
2017). This leads to the question of how couples’ joint retirement decision
was affected by the mandate – if only one parent has to delay retirement
for the dependent to benefit from the mandate, how did couples decide who
would delay retirement?
I consider three factors which could affect this decision: gender, rela-
tive earnings, and relative age. Previous studies have found that women are
more likely than men to spend transfers and savings on dependents (Duflo
2000; Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2010). We might expect to see the same
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phenomenon here: women may be more willing than men to adjust their
labor supply to provide dependent health insurance. In this policy setting,
delaying retirement to take advantage of dependent coverage is loosely anal-
ogous to spending (time, not money) on a dependent’s health. In Table 7
column 1, I add an interaction with a dummy for female, Femalei, and re-
strict my analysis to married individuals. I find no statistically significant
difference between married men and married women’s responses.
The decision to retire depends crucially on earnings and age, so next
I see if relative age and earnings within a couple affect which spouse re-
sponds to the mandate. I define the dummy variable EarnMorei to be 1 if
individual i earns more than her spouse.7 Relative earnings could matter
because the higher-earner has greater bargaining power, but also simply
because the higher earner derives greater returns to working. From the
statistically insignificant coefficient on Treati × Enactt × EarnMorei in
column 2, we see that being the higher-earning spouse has no effect on
retirement response.
I also define dummy variable Olderi, which is 1 if individual i is older
than her spouse. The older spouse could have a higher marginal cost of
working (say, if disutility from work increases with age or decreases with
health), and she may also have a higher opportunity cost of continuing to
work if she qualifies for Social Security benefits. In column 3, the coefficient
on the interaction term Treati×Enactt×Oldert is positive and significant,
meaning the older spouse is less likely to delay retirement (i.e., more likely
to retire) than the younger spouse.
Older spouses may be less likely to delay retirement because they face
higher disutility from continuing to work at an older age, or possibly be-
cause they qualify for Social Security while their younger spouse does not.
7I use average pre-policy earnings in 2009. Using post-policy earnings is unsuitable
since the outcome variable is retirement, and retirement mechanically affects earnings.
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Table 7: Regressions with within-household characteristic
Outcome variable: monthly retirement rate
(1) (2) (3)
Treati × Enactt -0.023∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
Treati × Enactt × Femalei -0.016
(0.013)
Treati × Enactt × EarnMorei -0.010
(0.012)
Treati × Enactt ×Olderi 0.036∗∗∗
(0.013)
Seam X X X
Indiv. FE X X X
Month-year effect X X X
Individuals 2148 1046 1046
Observations 112668 56414 56414
Standard errors in parentheses
(1)Femalei: 1 if female
(2) EarnMorei: 1 if earned more than spouse in 2009 and both working.
(3) Olderi: 1 if older than spouse and both working in 2009.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
As shown in Table 5, Social Security eligibility is an important factor in
the retirement decision and size of the response. Next, I categorize individ-
uals by their own (i) and their spouse’s (s) age, relative to the early Social
Security age of 62 (by 2013). Individuals can be in a marriage where both
are too young to qualify for Social Security (column 1), where both are old
enough to qualify by the end of the panel (column 2), where the individual
is old enough but the spouse is not (column 3), and where the individual
is not old enough but the spouse is (column 4). Note that the individuals
in column 3 should be married to the individuals in column 4. I run the
main specification on each group and report results in Table 8.
The most responsive subsample consists of individuals who themselves
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Table 8: Couples with SS-eligible and SS-ineligible Spouse
Outcome variable: monthly retirement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
i < 62 i ≥ 62 i ≥ 62 i < 62
s < 62 s ≥ 62 s < 62 s ≥ 62
Treati × Enactt -0.010 -0.017 -0.005 -0.048∗
(0.009) (0.030) (0.032) (0.028)
Seam X X X X
Indiv. FE X X X X
Month-year effect X X X X
Individuals 1044 462 219 220
Observations 54820 26401 11634 11713
Standard errors in parentheses
(1) Subsample: individual and spouse ineligible for SS
(2) Subsample: individual and spouse eligible for SS by 2013
(3) Subsample: individual eligible for SS by 2013 but spouse ineligible
(4) Subsample: individual ineligible but spouse eligible by 2013
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
are too young to qualify, but are married to spouses who qualify for Social
Security (column 4). Their spouses (column 3), in contrast, do not respond
to the mandate. This coincides with the evidence from Table 7 that older
spouses are less likely to delay retirement in response to the mandate, and
the evidence from Figure 5 that parents did not forgo Social Security to
take advantage of the mandate. Together, they suggest that some couples
coordinated to take advantage of two public policies: the SS-eligible parent
retires and claims Social Security, while the SS-ineligible parent delays
retirement to hold on to dependent insurance.
6 Discussion
The main results show that the ACA dependent mandate significantly de-
creased the likelihood of retirement for eligible parents, especially those
considering early retirement. Since almost all individuals will eventually
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Figure 6: Percent retired by age in post-policy period and bootstrapped
non-parametric regression fitted lines (n=1000) (left); Horizontal retire-
ment age differences. Bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals (n=1000)
(right)
retire, this decreased probability eventually translates into a delay in retire-
ment age. In order to interpret the findings and benchmark them against
other studies, I calculate the length of retirement delay implied by my re-
sults. One challenge is that retirement age is censored for many individuals
because of the panel structure of the data. So, I cannot use retirement age
as an outcome variable. Instead, I calculate the horizontal distance between
the treated and control retirement profiles in Figure 5 at each quantile of
retirement age, which corresponds to the percent retired at each age. In
Figure 6, I non-parametrically estimate the retirement profiles for treated
and control, and then predict the retirement age difference at each quantile
of retirement age.
The difference in retirement age is positive for almost every quantile and
statistically significant between the 9th and 18th quantiles. Between the
1st and 50th quantiles, the average difference between treated and control
retirement ages was 0.74. The largest statistically significant difference was
1.7, at the 9th quantile. If we assume rank preservation8, we can interpret
this as a treatment effect at each quantile. This means that the mandate
8Meaning that an individual remains in the same retirement age quantile whether
she is in treated or control.
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caused individuals at the 9th quantile to delay retirement by 1.7 years.
If we do not assume rank preservation, this still means that the mandate
shifted the 9th quantile of retirement age up by 1.7 years.
If we assume rank preservation, then we can compare the treatment
effect of this mandate to findings of other studies. Madrian et al. (1994)
found that retirement health insurance availability led workers to retire
0.4-1.2 years earlier. French and Jones (2011) estimated that raising the
Medicare age to 67 delayed retirement by only 0.07 years. Brown (2013)
found that in response to a 10 percent increase in return to work, individu-
als delayed retirement by 0.17 years. So, my finding that some individuals
delayed on average 0.74 years, and up to 1.7 years, in response to the de-
pendent mandate is relatively large. One possible explanation could be
that the dependent mandate was well-publicized and had a straightfor-
ward eligibility cutoff of 26. Over 70 percent of the public was aware of the
provision within a month of enactment (Kaiser Family Foundation 2010).
There is evidence of large “statutory age effects” on retirement which are
independent of pure financial incentives, in line with a behavioral model of
retirement where statutory ages serve as reference points (Seibold 2017).
Thus, the cutoff of 26 could have been a salient “statutory age” around
which parents planned their retirement.
These findings also raise additional questions, which are left for further
work. While I show empirical evidence of how couples’ behavior changes
in response to the mandate, one could potentially combine this with a
model of the joint retirement decision. This model would have to take
into account the well-documented fact that couples tend to retire together.
In the overall SIPP sample, we see that a large portion of couples retire
within the same month, as shown in Figure A.9. While previous studies
have modeled the joint retirement decision (Gustman and Steinmeier 2004;
Gustman and Steinmeier 2000; Lee 2017), the quasi-experimental setting
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of the ACA dependent mandate presents an opportunity to get a better
sense of how much a household values joint retirement.
Looking beyond the individuals affected by mandate, we may wonder
about its impact on firms. Throughout this paper, I implicitly assumed that
firms could not respond to the mandate by encouraging workers to retire or
reducing their compensation. Both of these would attenuate my job lock
finding. However, it has been shown that the mandate increased premiums
for insurance plans covering dependents (Depew and Bailey 2015) and that
workers in firms offering dependent coverage saw annual wages decrease by
$1200 (Goda, Farid, and Bhattacharya 2016), both of which would bias my
findings toward zero. Given this paper’s finding that firms not only had
to pay for additional dependent coverage but also had to accommodate
workers delaying retirement, it would be interesting to explore how each of
these channels affected firms.
In summary, I use the ACA dependent mandate to estimate the ef-
fect of dependent insurance on parental retirement rates, and find that the
ACA significantly decreased the likelihood of retirement for eligible par-
ents. On average, dependent insurance coverage reduced the retirement
rate for the treated group by 2.9 percentage points after policy enactment,
which is 14.8 percent of the retirement rate absent the policy. Assuming
rank preservation, this means that in response to the policy, individuals
delayed retirement by 0.74 years on average, and up to 1.7 years. I did
not find that the mandate affected other labor force outcomes like non-
retirement exits and employer changes. The effect was particularly large
for early retirees, although I find evidence that parents do not forgo Social
Security benefits in response to the mandate. I find that Social Security
eligibility plays a role in a couple’s joint decision about which spouse delays
retirement to take advantage of the mandate. Couples with one SS-eligible
spouse and one SS-ineligible spouse tend to coordinate so that the former
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retires to claim Social Security and the latter delays retirement. Alto-
gether, the findings raise the point that it is important to consider how
various government programs interact with each other to shape individual
and household incentives. Specifically, in this case, individuals and cou-
ples faced the tradeoff of whether to retire and claim Social Security, or
delay retirement to obtain dependent health insurance. Overall, the man-
date reshaped both retirement patterns for individuals and joint retirement
patterns for married couples.
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A Appendix - Figures
Figure A.1: Monthly probability of not working (left); not working and
looking for work (right). Dashed vertical line represents policy announce-
ment in March 2010; solid vertical line represents policy enactment Septem-
ber 2010.
Figure A.2: Monthly probability of not working and not looking for work
(left); partial LF exit (right). Dashed vertical line represents policy an-
nouncement in March 2010; solid vertical line represents policy enactment
September 2010.
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Figure A.3: Monthly probability of not working, not looking for work,
and not retired (left); job change (right). Dashed vertical line represents
policy announcement in March 2010; solid vertical line represents policy
enactment September 2010.
Figure A.4: Monthly probability of retirement for placebo group (left);
Medicaid recipients (right). Dashed vertical line represents policy an-
nouncement in March 2010; solid vertical line represents policy enactment
September 2010.
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Figure A.5: Monthly probability of retirement for individuals without in-
surance in 2009 (left); Counterfactual (September 2008) (right). Dashed
vertical line represents policy announcement in March 2010; solid vertical
line represents policy enactment September 2010 (or September 2008 for
counterfactual).
Figure A.6: Monthly coefficients for placebo (left); Medicaid recipients
(right)
Figure A.7: Monthly coefficients for parents with no insurance in 2009
(left); 2008 counterfactual policy (right)
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Figure A.8: Interaction coefficient by parent’s age in 2010. Confidence
intervals are 95%.
Figure A.9: Months between wife and husband’s retirement dates if both
retirements observed in SIPP
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B Appendix - Tables
Table B.1: Regression coefficients by 2008-2013 age cohort. Outcome vari-
able: monthly retirement rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Young Early Full Early or Full Old
Treati × Enactt -0.014∗ -0.036∗ 0.076 -0.027 0.103
(0.007) (0.021) (0.085) (0.021) (0.093)
Seam X X X X X
Indiv. FE X X X X X
Month-year effect X X X X X
Individuals 1808 668 107 838 45
Observations 95216 37141 6101 46682 2429
Standard errors in parentheses
(1) Subsample: individuals who are < 62 in 2013
(2) Subsample: individuals who turn 62 between 2008 and 2013
(3) Subsample: individuals who turn 66 between 2008 and 2013.
(4) Subsample: individuals who turn 62 or 66 between 2008 and 2013
(5) Subsample: individuals who turned 66 before 2008.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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